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ABSTRACT 
Royal Air Force aircrew endured mental and physical stresses during bombing 
operations. Their chances of completing a tour of operations unscathed were around 
one in four, and many were aware the chances were slim. Some who refused to fly 
were accused of ‘lacking moral fibre’ (LMF). Although this was not a medical 
diagnosis it is frequently viewed through the lens of mental health and reactions to 
trauma and it has become a powerful and important cultural phenomenon. This 
article re-examines LMF in the culture of the wartime Royal Air Force, before 
considering how and why LMF is remembered by veterans and in popular histories 
since the war. 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Lack of moral fibre’ (LMF) was a metaphorical ‘dreadful stick’ intended to deter 
aircrew refusals to fly and displays of ‘cowardice’ during the Second World War.1 
Cases were rare, but there are tales of humiliating parades; offenders were publicly 
stripped of their ‘wings’ and rank and marched away. LMF was never a medical 
diagnosis, but its history is complicated by how changing medical theories are 
understood and by assessments of the numbers involved using imprecise definitions. 
By re-examining the historiography of this accusation and many of the sources 
historians have used, this article explores beliefs about courage and ostensible 
cowardice within Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command during the war itself, and 
how it has been remembered. It argues that LMF is shrouded in myths influenced by 
changing medical beliefs, the limitation of archival sources, and veterans’ hopes for 
recognition. The article is in three sections and examines the LMF procedure during 
 
*Dan Ellin is the archivist for the International Bomber Command Centre Digital 
Archive at the University of Lincoln. 
DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v6i3.1425 
1Imperial War Museum (IWM), Sound Archive, 22367, Bird, P D. See also Edgar Jones, 
‘LMF: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World 
War’ The Journal of Military History, No. 70, (April 2006) p. 440. 
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the war, the historiography and how the process has been remembered in veterans’ 
oral testimonies. The first part uses archive material and medical sources to examine 
the deployment of this assertion during the war in the context of beliefs about mental 
health, military discipline, and morale. It argues that LMF was an executive process 
intended to reduce the numbers of aircrew who refused to fly. However, as will be 
discussed, it was frequently conflated with mental health issues and often regarded as 
a medical problem. As Daniel Ussishkin argues, by the twentieth century, it was 
recognised that military discipline resided in the individual, and it was thought that 
modern society produced ‘men who were selfish, effeminate, individualistic and 
excitable.’2 The consensus of medical opinion during the war was that people 
diagnosed with hysteria or anxiety were thought to be predisposed to illness or were 
simply the wrong ‘type.’3 Aircrew were expected to be the pinnacle of society and the 
military hierarchy however, and in 1939, the RAF was unprepared for neuropsychiatric 
casualties or men who refused to fly. By 1945, medical professionals were more 
inclined to accept that everyone had a limit to their endurance. However, there has 
been a further, significant paradigm shift since then. Rather than the individual being at 
fault, the primacy of a traumatic event has become established in both the medical 
profession and in popular understanding.4 It is now accepted that anyone can succumb 
to trauma and since the creation and popularisation of the diagnosis in the 1980s, LMF 
is often recalled in the context of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The second 
part of this article considers the historiography of LMF as well as discussing its cultural 
representations in film, television and published veteran memoirs. LMF has continued 
to be regarded as a medical issue by many. The concept of LMF has remained a popular 
trope within the RAF, among veterans and within the general population. It has been 
amplified and mythologised over the last seven decades. The final section uses oral 
histories recently recorded for the International Bomber Command Centre’s (IBCC) 
Digital Archive and considers veterans testimonies about LMF as victim narratives. 
The article concludes that tales of LMF were embellished and circulated verbally 
throughout the RAF, during training and on operational stations. Many aircrew who 
were assumed to be LMF may have been posted away for medical or other reasons. 
This article argues that for many airmen, witnessing the humiliating ritual was not 
necessary; rumours of LMF were as effective and made a lasting impression on them.  
 
 
2Daniel Ussishkin, Morale: A Modern British History, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), p. 49, p. 61. 
3The National Archives (hereinafter TNA) AIR 20/10727, David Stafford-Clark, 
‘Personal Observations on Flying Stress.’  
4Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, ‘A paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of 
psychological trauma in the 20th Century’, Journal of Anxiety Disorders, Vol. 21, No.2, 
(2007), pp. 164-175. 
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LMF during the war 
In 1939, the British government determined to avoid a costly repetition of the volume 
of shell shock cases from the First World War. A memorandum was distributed 
explaining that the term ‘shell shock’ was not to be used.5  The symptoms of thousands 
of men suffering from shell shock during the First World War were explained by their 
own inherent weaknesses rather than the trauma of industrial warfare.6 Often hidden 
from the gaze of their immediate superiors, soldiers were increasingly expected to 
find their discipline from within, but men who had fought in the previous war did so 
knowing there was the ultimate sanction of execution for desertion or cowardice. 
This was not the case in the Second World War, but as aircrew were selected and 
well-trained volunteers, it was expected that the numbers of those who found 
themselves unable to perform their duties would be limited. Even so, some symptoms 
of stress were expected, and the Air Ministry published ‘Pamphlet 100’ informing 
Medical Officers how to support aircrew. The pamphlet outlined prevalent theories 
on the causation and symptomology of neuroses. The warning signs of a ‘pre-neurotic 
state’ included: 
 
a. Fatigue.  
b. Increased indulgence in alcohol or tobacco. 
c. A tendency to become unsociable or irritable. 
d. Loss of interests, disinclination for effort. 
e. Emotional crises, loss of self-control. 
f. Falling off in flying efficiency. 
g. Physical symptoms such as loss of appetite, of sleep or of weight, the 
presence of tremors and tachycardia, and typical anxiety facies.7 
 
Medical Officers were to refer individuals to specialists at RAF hospitals. From there, 
airmen could be returned to duty, be admitted for convalescence or invalided from 
the service.8 The RAF was under the illusion, that as an elite with a high proportion of 
 
5‘Neuroses in War Time: Memorandum for the Medical Profession’ British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 2, No, 4119, (1939) p. 1200. 
6Mathew Thomson, ‘Status, Manpower and Mental Fitness: Mental Deficiency in The 
First World War’ in: Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, (eds.), War 
Medicine and Modernity, (Stroud: Sutton, 1999), pp. 154-155. 
7TNA AIR 2/8591, Air Ministry ‘Pamphlet 100 ‘Notes for Medical Officers on the 
Psychological care of flying personnel’ May 1939. Tachycardia is the medical term for 
a heart rate over 100 beats per minute. Anxiety facies are the typical facial expressions 
and appearance of someone experiencing anxiety. For the flyers’ experience in the 
First World War see: Lynsey Shaw Cobden ‘The Nervous Flyer: Nerves, Flying and 
the First World War’, British Journal of Military History Vol. 4, No. 2, 2018, pp.121-142. 
8TNA AIR 2/8591, Air Ministry ‘Pamphlet 100’. 
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officers, aircrew would not be too susceptible to stress, but after some squadrons 
experienced unsustainable losses, they found that this assumption was false.9 
 
The term ‘lack of moral fibre’ was first used at a meeting 21 March 1940 to discuss 
the increasing number of airmen who refused to fly on operations, and a set of rules 
was circulated to all Commands the following month.10 A revised version dated 28 
Sept 1941, stipulated the management of airmen, ‘who though not medical cases, come 
to forfeit the confidence of their Commanding Officers without having been subjected 
to any exceptional strain of operational flying.’ Often referred to as the ‘waverer 
letter’, it stated, the individual, though physically fit, must be proved to be lacking in 
moral fibre. There must be no question of any medical disability, and if the individual 
shows any medical symptoms to account for his inability to face operational flying he 
must be regarded as a medical case.11 
 
On an operational station, it is likely that only senior officers knew the content of the 
letter regarding LMF, and it must be remembered that the guidance on LMF was 
altered throughout the war.12 It also meant different things to different people. Senior 
officers often believed LMF required a medical diagnosis, while the RAF’s medical 
consultants and some Medical Officers were determined to ensure that LMF was an 
executive and not a medical matter.13 However, the distinction between LMF and 
psychoneuroses was never resolved. Medical Officers were caught in the middle of 
the conflict, while RAF personnel and members of the public were left to rely on 
rumour and speculation for their understanding of LMF.  
 
Both psychological illnesses and a lack of discipline were thought to be influenced by 
issues of class and an individual’s inherent weakness of character. As Martin Francis 
argues, concepts of fear and bravery within the RAF were ‘closely attuned to the 
emotional codes and standards of a wider society’. Reactions to stress and anxiety 
were shaped by the concepts of Edwardian stoicism and masculinity.14 Wartime 
psychiatry rested on the belief that some people were predisposed to mental 
 
9Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939 – 1945, (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 
p. 242. 
10John McCarthy, ‘Aircrew and Lack of Moral Fibre in the Second World War’ War 
and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1984), p. 87. 
11TNA AIR 2/8591, Letter S.61141/S.7.C, 28 September 1940. 
12McCarthy, ‘Aircrew and Lack of Moral Fibre’, p. 88. 
13TNA AIR 29/764/6, RAF Hospital Rauceby, May 1943. 
14Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 203, p. 130. 
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breakdown through inherited or acquired characteristics.15 The RAF’s medical 
consultants believed that non-commissioned officers (NCOs) broke down more 
frequently because of these fixed and ‘inherent qualities’.16 In the previous war, officers 
were diagnosed with anxiety while similar symptoms displayed by other ranks were 
interpreted as hysteria.17 In the 1940s, eugenicist discourses were still prevalent in a 
class bound society.18 The attitude to class within the RAF was similar; ground 
personnel and women in the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force were expected to be less 
disciplined and more prone to mental health problems.19 Responsible for investigating 
potential cases of LMF, Wing Commander James Lawson found that almost half were 
from wireless operators and gunners and ‘that the educational standard was the main 
cause.’ He felt that some aircrew struggled with the ‘unwelcome knowledge, however 
true, that they were of inferior quality.’20 Medical Officer, Squadron Leader David 
Stafford-Clark suggested that aircrew sergeants, especially air gunners and flight 
engineers, were more prone to neuropsychological illnesses or LMF because, for a 
problematic minority, their motive for volunteering to become aircrew was often 
‘simply glamour and promotion’.21 Lawson and Stafford-Clark were not representative 
of most officers on operational stations who had to decide what to do with a 
‘wavering’ airman however. Both were actively involved in the process of LMF and in 
defining what it meant. Stafford-Clark devoted time and effort considering the 
management and treatment of personnel, while Lawson was in charge of the LMF 
process.22 Both were, and have continued to be, influential in creating the social, and 
 
15Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 58-59. 
16Charles Symonds and Denis Williams, ‘Personal Investigation of Psychological 
Disorders In Flying Personnel of Bomber Command.’ Air Ministry, Psychological 
Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force Investigated During The War 1939-1945, 
(London: HMSO, 1947), p. 51. 
17Richard Gillespie, Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier, (London: Chapman 
and Hall, 1942), p. 210. 
18Felix Brown ‘Heredity in the Psychoneuroses’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, Vol. 35, No. 12, (1942), pp. 785-790. 
19Francis, The Flyer, pp. 49-53. For more on the role of the medical officer and mental 
health within Bomber Command see Dan Ellin, The many behind the few: the lives and 
emotions of Erks and WAAFs of RAF Bomber Command 1939-1945. PhD thesis, University 
of Warwick, (2015), pp. 246-297. 
20 Wellcome Collection (WC), WL, PP/DSC/E/1, Stafford-Clark, Private Papers, Letter 
from Wing Commander Lawson to David Stafford-Clark 14 August 1945. 
21David Stafford-Clark, ‘Morale and Flying Experience: Results of a Wartime Study’, 
Journal of Mental Science, Vol. 95, No. 398, (1949), p. 16.   
22Air Historical Branch (AHB), James Lawson, ‘Memorandum on executive action 
(LMF)’; David Stafford-Clark, ‘Aspects of War Medicine in the RAF’ British Medical 
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cultural perceptions around the concept of LMF. The treatment aircrew received 
varied between stations and depended on senior officers’ interpretation of the 
procedure. The disproportionate number of NCO cases may partly be explained 
because senior officers could not observe aircrew in the sergeants’ mess; 
consequently, they were less able to offer advice, prophylactic treatment or rest.23 
Often, neither Medical Officers, nor Commanding Officers wanted to be responsible 
for the process. By 1944, some senior officers noted the ‘confusion which arises 
between “Anxiety” and LMF cases’ and concluded that it was ‘entirely a medical 
matter.’24 LMF was a medical responsibility at other stations too. In May 1944, a 
Medical Officer recorded ‘Lack of confidence – Nil’ in 12 squadron’s Operational 
Record Book.25 The management of LMF cases was inconsistent throughout the war 
and across different stations. However, many of the beliefs about LMF were consistent 
with what the aircrews themselves understood about LMF, then, and decades later. 
LMF was equated with fear, cases occurred in ‘epidemics’ and effective leadership was 
believed to help reduce the likelihood of occurrences.26  
 
Many sources give an insight into the development of the LMF policy by the Air 
Ministry, but they are not relevant to its practical application. Historians have used 
sources about the medical treatment of neuropsychiatric patients by the RAF, but 
while the consultants and Medical Officers had a role to play, LMF was not a medical 
diagnosis. The problem was, and remains, a matter of definition. It relied on senior 
officers making a judgement about the motives. morale, and mental health of an 
individual. Some aircrew who refused to fly flagrantly disobeyed orders, while others 
were suffering from neuropsychiatric disorders. Unfortunately, there was never an 
effective administrative procedure in place to make a distinction between the two.27 
Historians have attempted to find the numbers involved, but there is no definitive 
answer. Sources from early in the war offer a snapshot of the procedure before it was 
well established, but later sources tend to be rather generalised.28 In April 1945, the 
Director-General of Medical Services reported that 
 
 
Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4282, (1943), pp. 139–140; Stafford-Clark, ‘Morale and Flying 
Experience’, pp. 10-50; David Stafford-Clark, Psychiatry Today, (London: Penguin, 
1952).  
23Symonds and Williams, ‘Personal Investigation’, p. 38. 
24TNA AIR 29/851, 31 Base, Stradishall, Base Commanders conference 3 March 1944. 
25TNA AIR 27/168, 12 Squadron operational record book.  
26Symonds and Williams, ‘Personal Investigation’, pp. 53-54. 
27Lynsey Shaw-Cobden, Neuropsychiatry and the management of aerial warfare: the Royal 
Air Force neuropsychiatric division in the Second World War, PhD thesis, University of 
Oxford, (2016), pp.194-197. 
28TNA AIR 2/8591, Aircrew who refuse or are unfit to fly: disposal policy. 
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Each year there are about 3000 cases of nervous breakdown in air crew and 
about 300 cases of lack of confidence. A third of the neurosis cases occur in 
Bomber Command.29  
 
James Lawson’s papers are perhaps the best source we have. Dated 23 November 
1945, it is probable that the figures in his memorandum are the final total of cases 
examined: 30 
 
Total submitted 4059 
Officers 746 
Airmen 3313 
Total classified 2726 
Officers 389 
Airmen 2337 
 
Lawson found that a third of cases were in Bomber Command, that LMF was applied 
to more NCOs than officers,31 and that more gunners and wireless operators were 
submitted than other trades.32 The evidence also highlights that a large proportion of 
cases occurred at training units.33 
      
The ‘waverer letter’ is also worthy of a re-examination. The paragraphs concerning 
medical diagnoses were altered in different versions of the letter, but the three 
categories of airmen who were deemed not to cope with the stresses of flying 
remained relatively unchanged. The 1943 letter categorised them as: 
 
(i) Those who though medically fit… come to forfeit the confidence of their 
Commanding Officers without having been subjected to any exceptional 
flying stress… 
(ii) Those who are given a permanent medical category… solely on account 
of symptoms which are nervous in origin arising from inability to stand up 
to the strain of their duties, and without having been subjected to any 
exceptional flying stress… 
(iii) Those not included in (ii) above who are given a medical category lower 
than A1B or A3B…  on account of physical disability; physical illness or 
 
29TNA AIR 2/6252, Psychological disorders in flying personnel: occurrence reports. 
30AHB, Lawson ‘Memorandum’.  
31Ibid. 
32WC, PP/DSC/E/1, Letter from James Lawson to David Stafford-Clark 14 August 
1945. 
33AHB, Lawson ‘Memorandum’. 
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injury complicated by nervous symptoms; or nervous illness caused by 
factors entirely unrelated to their duties…34 
 
Whether they were LMF or given a medical diagnosis, officers in the first two 
categories lost their commission, and NCOs were re-mustered to a ground trade or 
transferred to the Army. Officers and NCOs in category three were invalided from 
the service or re-mustered to ground duties.35 Some at the Air Ministry were aware 
that there was little separating the treatment of airmen discharged under the first two 
categories of the letter 
 
In effect we accord to the airman who had honestly tried to make good but 
who failed and was declared permanently unfit for flying duties because of 
inherent physical disability the same treatment, so far as the outward and visible 
signs were concerned, as we accorded to “W” cases.36  
 
Throughout the war, those in both category one and two had permission to wear 
their aircrew badge withdrawn. However, all versions of the letter made it clear that 
the LMF procedure did ‘not preclude court martial for flagrant cases of refusal to fly’, 
and although the airman’s documents were to have a ‘W’ marked on his Form 1580, 
no reference was ‘to appear on any documents issued to the airman on discharge from 
the service.’37 Archived examples of the paperwork required for the LMF procedure 
include a signed statement by an airman and reports by the Commanding Officer and 
Medical Officer. They show that the procedure in the waverer letter could be followed 
without the humiliating ritual.38 
 
The waverer letter encouraged the Medical Officer to take the responsibility for the 
decision, but the RAF’s neuropsychiatric consultants argued that the amount of flying 
stress endured was ‘best judged by men who themselves have experience of 
operational flying.’39 Although few Medical Officers flew on operations, the importance 
 
34TNA AIR 19/632, Letter S.61141/S.7.C, 1 June 1943. 
35Ibid.  
36TNA AIR 19/632, Air Council conclusions of a meeting 24 August 1943. 
37TNA AIR 19/632, Letter S.61141/S.7.C, 1 June 1943. The letters are dated 28 
September 1940, 19 May 1941, 16 June 1941, 19 July 1941, 19 September 1941, 1 June 
1943 and 1 March 1945. 
38TNA AIR 2/8591, Aircrew who refuse or are unfit to fly. 
39TNA AIR 2/4935, Consultants in Neuro-psychiatry ‘Comments on the memorandum 
on the Disposal of Members of Aircrews who Forfeit the Confidence of their 
Commanding Officers, S.61141/S.7.c (1), 1 June 1943. 
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of the role of the Medical Officer is often stressed.40 David Stafford-Clark’s opinions 
in particular have been influential in the understanding of LMF. Contrary to the Air 
Ministry’s three categories, he placed airmen in four distinct groups consisting of 
temporary and permanent failures. Only a minority who suffered exceptional strain 
would return to flying duties; almost all the others required ‘executive and not medical 
action.’41 Stafford-Clark believed that few required ‘recourse to the services of a 
neuro-psychiatrist’.42 However, although he had the confidence to categorise airmen, 
many others did not. Qualifying in psychiatry after the war, he was not a typical Medical 
Officer. The treatment of wavering aircrew varied considerably between stations and 
depended on the knowledge and understanding of individual Medical Officers, who 
sought the opinion of a specialist more frequently.43 While Medical Officers found 
predisposition to neurosis in 45 percent of cases, neuropsychiatric specialists found it 
in almost 75 percent.44 Aircrew themselves, had an inherent suspicion of ‘trick cyclists’ 
as they called psychiatrists, and this has also fed into the myth of LMF.45 
 
Aircrew were seen by neuropsychiatric specialists at Not Yet Diagnosed 
Neuropsychiatric (NYDN) centres. They were based at RAF Hospitals, and led by a 
neuropsychiatric specialist, provided for both in and out-patients.46 An article in the 
British Medical Journal claimed that every new patient was ‘reviewed completely and 
anew’.47 However, the psychiatrist, Eric Jewesbury, stressed the importance of the 
opinion of others. He wished that the staff on stations had the confidence to shorten 
 
40120 medical officers were qualified pilots by 1945. See: ‘Aviation Medical Research: 
Air Marshal Whittingham’s Address’ British Medical Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4390, 1945, p. 
271. Some doctors flew on operations. See for example: Roland Winfield, The Sky 
Belongs to Them, (London: William Kimber, 1976), p. 134.  
41TNA AIR 20/10727, Stafford-Clark, ‘Personal Observations’; Stafford-Clark, ‘Aspects 
of War Medicine’, pp. 139-140; Stafford-Clark, ‘Morale and Flying Experience’, pp. 10-
50. 
42TNA AIR 20/10727, Stafford-Clark, ‘Personal Observations’. 
43Charles Symonds and Denis Williams, ‘Investigation of Psychological Disorders in 
Flying Personnel by Unit Medical Officers’, Air Ministry, Psychological Disorders in Flying 
Personnel of the Royal Air Force Investigated During The War 1939-1945, (London: HMSO, 
1947), p. 92.  
44Symonds and Williams, ‘Investigation of Psychological Disorders’, p. 92. 
45Tom Sawyer, Only Owls and Bloody Fools Fly at Night, (William Kimber, London, 1982), 
p. 136, See also: Campbell Muirhead, The Diary of a Bomb Aimer, (Tunbridge Wells: 
Spellmount, 1987), p.124. 
46TNA AIR 2/5998, Organisation of Neurology and Psychiatry in the Royal Air Force. 
47S. I. Ballard and H. G. Miller, ‘Neuropsychiatry at a Royal Air Force Centre: an 
Analysis of 2,000 Cases’ British Medical Journal, No. 2, Vol. 4357, (1944), p. 42. 
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the tours for some aircrew without referring them to specialists.48 Like Stafford-Clark, 
Jewesbury criticised the LMF procedure and had his own system of categorising 
aircrew depending on the amount of individual predisposition and flying stress 
experienced. He did not think it was right that ground personnel could be given a 
medical discharge and pension for a condition aggravated by their service, while 
aircrew with a neurosis could be ‘ignominiously reduced in rank’ or discharged 
without a pension. He felt it was unnecessary to stigmatise aircrew by removing their 
flying badge and also pointed out the similarities between the treatment of airmen in 
categories one and two.49 Medical professionals like Jewesbury and Stafford-Clark 
refused to label aircrew as LMF, and the numbers assessed by Jewesbury suggest that 
many station Medical Officers felt the same. Airmen who were not given a medical 
diagnosis were attached to RAF Uxbridge, RAF Eastchurch or, after October 1943, 
the Air Crew Disposal Unit (ACDU), for an executive decision. 
  
RAF Eastchurch, infamous in stories about LMF, became the reselection centre in May 
1943.50 Aircrew from the ACDUs continued to be sent there for reselection, and 
other airmen briefly posted to reselection centres spread rumours that added to the 
mythology of LMF.51 The conditions at RAF Eastchurch were not pleasant but aircrew 
were not cruelly treated. Found ‘unfit to captain an aircraft’, a Flight Sergeant posted 
there was tasked to paint posts around the parade ground. However, he soon realised 
that it was only necessary to attend the morning parade and it was common practice 
for personnel to leave the camp through a hole in the fence.52 A Senior Medical Officer, 
highlighted that delays in reselection from Eastchurch were caused by the necessity of 
further investigation of both medical and executive cases.53 Airmen were not badly 
treated at ACDUs either, and it is clear that individual cases were still being 
investigated at both establishments. Airmen at Chessington, Usworth and Keresley 
Grange were entertained with dances, trips and lectures, and it is possible to follow 
 
48A typical first tour was expected to be 30 operations, although the squadron 
commander had some discretion. Pathfinder crews were expected to complete 45 
operations in their first tour. See: Mark K Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied 
aircrew Experience in the Second World War, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 125. 
49TNA AIR 49/357, Eric Jewesbury, ‘Work and Problems of an RAF Neuropsychiatric 
Centre’. 
50TNA AIR 28/243, Eastchurch. 
51TNA AIR 28/243, Eastchurch; Miles Tripp, The Eighth Passenger, (Ware: 
Wordsworth, 2002), p. 39; Don Charlwood, No Moon Tonight, (Manchester: Crecy 
Publishing, 2007), p. 56.  
52Norfolk Record Office (NRO), Wartime Memoirs, MC 2153/3, 926X7, Roy J. 
Larkins, ‘The Pilot who missed the war: an everyday story of flying folk 1623560 Flight 
Sergeant Larkins, R.J.’, pp. 461-470. 
53TNA AIR 28/243, Eastchurch. 
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the progress of individuals through the system. Some visited Ear, Nose and Throat 
specialists and had decompression tests. Airmen sent to the ACDU were not treated 
harshly or hastily and were not all found LMF. Some were downgraded medically, 
while others were Court Martialled. Personnel were also interviewed by Wing 
Commander Lawson and his importance in the LMF process is clear.54 Lawson 
highlighted that the treatment of airmen varied throughout the war and at different 
stations. He thought it unfair that wireless operators could remain in the RAF as 
ground based wireless operators, while other aircrew had no relevant trade.55 In an 
attempt to avoid using LMF procedure, some airmen were transferred to different 
aircraft types or given temporary medical categories. In contrast, others were told 
they were ‘yellow’ and dismissed or dealt with by the orderly room NCO. Reflecting 
on the airmen he interviewed, Lawson believed that most were happy to be removed 
from flying ‘whatever the consequences’, and many were relieved to be able to discuss 
their fears. He maintained that many classified under the memorandum ‘accepted the 
decision without demur’ but that ‘all those who resented the decision’ were found to 
be ‘medically unfit’. Some men were more upset to have a medical diagnosis than to 
be labelled LMF, and while many were not concerned about the loss of rank, all 
mourned the loss of their flying badge.56  
 
The military has a long history of employing the fear of punishment to deter men from 
avoiding duty,57 and the fear of being thought of as LMF and experiencing the ritualistic 
stripping of rank and aircrew badge in front of their peers, was a cruel but effective 
deterrent. There is evidence that this ritual did occasionally occur, but it was not 
official policy. It is the narrative of this ritual however, that spread and effectively 
discouraged aircrew from refusing to fly. Airmen would have no way of knowing what 
happened to others once they left the station, but they understood that those found 
to be LMF were conscripted into the Army, sent to the coal mines, or forced to do 
menial tasks if they remained in the Air Force. It was also understood that a mark on 
their record would hinder their employment after the war. Recruits and trainee 
aircrew learned of the concept of LMF as they picked up the service ‘slanguage’.58 LMF 
was one of the many new acronyms they learned in the RAF, and for many, there was 
little between the judgement of LMF and a diagnosis of mental illness. LMF was one of 
the many phrases in the force’s vernacular to filter into the wider population. The 
Oxford English Dictionary records the first use of the term in Terrence Rattigan’s 
 
54TNA AIR 29/603/13, Air Crew Disposal Unit. 
55TNA AIR 2/8592, Aircrew who refuse or are unfit to fly. 
56AHB, Lawson, ‘Memorandum’. 
57Daniel Ussishkin, Morale, pp. 21-50. 
58E. H. Partridge, ‘Slanguage’ in R. Raymond and D. Langdon, (eds) Slipstream: A Royal 
Air Force Anthology, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946), pp. 60-65. 
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Flare Path in 1942.59 In the play, a pilot confesses he is losing his nerve and would be 
‘grounded. Lack of moral fibre.’60 An article in the Daily Express in January 1943 
discussed men who were ‘reduced in rank for loss of moral fibre’,61 and the Secretary 
of State for Air was questioned about LMF in Parliament.62 The limited number of 
mentions of LMF in the press should not be regarded as being due to a lack of 
knowledge of the term. It was agreed in a secret meeting in 1943, that the LMF 
‘arrangement would be difficult to defend if it ever attracted public criticism.’63 From 
then on, reporting on LMF in the press was restricted.64 The practice of LMF was 
officially discontinued in May 1946, but as Edgar Jones has argued, the ‘term had 
become part of RAF culture, and it continued to be used in peacetime’.65 As Martin 
Francis maintains, many of the myths about the RAF were already in place by 1945. 
The concept of LMF became increasingly important culturally as documents were 
declassified, people began to talk about their experiences, and challenge the 
stereotypical image of the heroic and glamourous flyer.66  
 
Historiography and Post War Representations of LMF  
In The Flyer, Francis examined cultural representations of airmen in the press, literature 
and cinema. His chapter ‘The Flyer and Fear’, discusses the concepts of courage and 
cowardice and how fears impacted on their identity.67 Their masculinity was a complex 
construction encompassing a combination of the gentle, thoughtful artist and a cold-
blooded killer.68 A similar wide variety of cultural sources as those used by Francis 
have influenced public understandings of LMF and it has become increasingly well 
known outside the RAF. Reports in the press complained that airmen were reduced 
in rank and had their records marked LMF, and another referred to LMF as ‘medical 
 
59Oxford English Dictionary, (2019), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/122086 
Accessed 17 February 2020. 
60Terrence Rattigan, ‘Flare Path’ in: The Winslow Boy: with two other plays, French Without 
Tears, Flare Path, (London: Pan, 1950), p. 227. 
61‘Clipped wings’ Daily Express, 4 January 1943, p. 2 and ‘Clipped wings’ Daily Express, 
6 January 1943, p. 2.  See the Air Ministry response to the article in TNA, AIR 19/632. 
62Hansard, ROYAL AIR FORCE (REDUCTIONS IN RANK) HC Deb 28 July 1943 
Vol 391 cc1607-8W https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-
answers/1943/jul/28/royal-air-force-reductions-in-rank Accessed 17 February 2020. 
63TNA AIR 19/632, Air Council conclusions of a meeting 24 August 1943.  
64AHB, James Lawson, ‘Memorandum’. 
65Jones, ‘LMF’, p. 454. 
66Francis, The Flyer, p.7 
67Ibid., pp. 106-131. 
68Ibid., pp. 201-204. 
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phraseology adopted by the Cabinet.’69 In the film, Appointment in London, a pilot is 
clearly suffering from stress towards the end of his third tour,70 and although Joseph 
Heller’s Catch 22, is about an American experience in Italy, it and its adaptations, have 
also influenced the ideas about mental health, morale and duty.71 The concept began 
to be associated with Bomber Command crew more than those in other commands 
as it became more widely known. References to LMF began to appear in memoirs 
published from the late 1950s, and as Frances Houghton has discovered, it has left ‘a 
visible imprint’ in their writing.72 Miles Tripp’s autobiography, The Eighth Passenger was 
one of the first Bomber Command veteran narratives published, and is probably the 
first to describe the LMF ritual.73 However, it was something that he had heard 
happened at a neighbouring squadron, rather than an event he witnessed.74 Very few 
actually claim to have witnessed it. The first published account is probably in Norman 
Longmate’s The Bombers: The RAF Offensive against Germany 1939 – 1945. He quotes 
an airman who witnessed a ‘punishment’ at RAF Langar.75 Two memoirs report similar 
parades at RAF Wickenby, but at different times.76 Other texts have also been 
influential in the construction of the public memory of LMF during the last decades of 
the twentieth century. In his novel, Bomber, Len Deighton brought LMF to millions of 
readers,77 and Martin Middlebrook’s The Nuremberg Raid helped to construct a popular 
narrative of aircrew being victims of poor strategic and tactical planning.78 In Bomber 
Command, Max Hastings reiterated the LMF ritual, but by his calculation that one in 
 
69G. Alligham, ‘L. M. F’ Daily Mail, 20 April 1945, p. 2; ‘RAF Discharges, protest against 
offensive phraseology’ The Manchester Guardian, 20 June 1945, p. 8. 
70Philip Leacock, Appointment in London, (British Lion Film Corporation, 1953). 
71Joseph Heller, Catch 22, (London: Vintage Books, 1994); Mike Nichols, Catch-22, 
(Paramount Films, 1970); Luke Davies, and David Michôd, Catch 22, (Hulu, 2019). 
72Frances Houghton, the Veterans’ Tale: British Military Memoirs of the Second World War, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 199. See for example: Charlwood, 
No Moon Tonight, p. 56; John Wainwright, Tail-End Charlie: One Man’s Journey Through a 
War, (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 178-185; Sawyer, Only Owls and Bloody Fools, pp. 
135-137, and Harry Yates, Luck and a Lancaster: Chance and Survival in World War Two, 
(Marlborough: Airlife Publishing, 2005), p. 48. 
73Houghton, The Veterans’ Tale, p.19. 
74Tripp, The Eighth Passenger, pp. 39-40. 
75Norman Longmate, The Bombers: The RAF Offensive against Germany 1939 – 1945, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1983), p. 188. 
76Jack Currie, Lancaster Target, (1981) (Manchester: Crecy Publishing, 2008), pp. 113-
114; Muirhead, The Diary of a Bomb Aimer, p. 31. Currie left RAF Wickenby in February 
1944. Muirhead was posted there in May 1944. See: TNA, AIR 27/167, and AIR 
27/2145. 
77Len Deighton, Bomber (London: Grafton, 1978), p. 294.  
78Martin Middlebrook, The Nuremberg Raid, (London: Cassell, 1980), pp. 55-57. 
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seven airmen failed to perform their duty due to ‘morale or medical causes’, he also 
effectively conflated LMF with medical diagnoses.79 The television play, The Brylcreem 
Boys, and a radio adaptation of Deighton’s Bomber brought many themes associated 
with war trauma to new audiences. In what is effectively a flashback, the cast of The 
Brylcreem Boys, relive the traumatic Nuremberg raid in their hospital ward.80 The 
aircrew are medical cases, but reviews and notes in the script discuss the play in terms 
of LMF, shell shock and PTSD.81 The adaptation of Bomber pitted a crew against their 
senior officers and the enemy defences.82 Both plays have references to anti-aircraft 
fire, night-fighters armed with upwards firing Schräge Musik cannon, and exploding 
aircraft mistakenly thought to be ‘scarecrow shells’. Both conform to the trope of 
aircrew as victims and arguably, both have influenced the popular memory of Bomber 
Command. 
 
The first academic study of LMF was by John McCarthy in 1984. He investigated its 
origins, tracked how the procedure changed during the war and attempted to calculate 
the numbers involved. He pointed out the weakness in Hastings’ calculations and, 
making the distinction between issues of morale and medical diagnoses, he suggested 
that less than one percent of Bomber Command aircrew were LMF.83 He discussed 
stress and the concept of predisposition, as well as highlighting the roles of Medical 
Officers, the RAF’s consultant neuropsychologists and ACDUs. In The Right of the Line, 
John Terraine examined LMF from the perspective of fear and bravery. Quoting 
extensively from the Lawson memorandum held by the Air Historical Branch, he 
concluded that less than half of a percent of bomber aircrew were LMF.84 Terraine 
saw the RAF as an elite and downplayed the cultural importance of LMF, but both he 
and McCarthy attempted to put the numbers in perspective and were the first to use 
many of the archival sources that would be revisited by other historians.  
 
 
79Max Hastings, Bomber Command, (London: Michael Joseph, 1980), pp. 214-216. 
80Roger Bamford and Peter Durrant, The Brylcreem Boys, (BBC2 Playhouse, 1979); 
Peter Durrant, The Brylcreem Boys, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2014), p. 28. The play 
aired on BBC 2 in 1979 and was repeated in 1981. 
81Durrant, The Brylcreem Boys, p. 71. See also: Internet Movie Data Base, ‘BBC2 
Playhouse (TV Series) The Brylcreem Boys’ 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0926882/plotsummary?ref_=tt_ov_pl#synopsis; British 
Film Institute ‘The Brylcreem Boys’,  
https://www.bfi.org.uk/films-tv-people/4ce2b6bbc4da9 Accessed 17 February 2020. 
82Joe Dunlop, Bomber - Len Deighton, BBC Radio 4, 1995. The play was repeated in 
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83McCarthy, ‘Aircrew and Lack of Moral Fibre’, p. 97. 
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The next academic studies were published ten years later. Alan English examined the 
role of Medical Officers and Neuropsychiatric Specialists. He was one of the first to 
make use of David Stafford-Clark’s work and Ironside and Batchelor’s Aviation Neuro-
Psychology.85 He stressed that RAF specialists largely conformed to theories of 
predisposition and breeding. Quoting a consultant neurologist, he acknowledged that 
‘flying stress’ was an umbrella term for the physical stresses of flight, not a diagnosis 
or the name of a new disorder. English calculated that 9431 aircrew were removed 
from flying duties.86 However, by speculating aircrew ‘were killed or wounded because 
they, or one of their companions, were mentally unsound’ and combining LMF airmen 
with those with a medical diagnosis, English fuelled the controversy surrounding the 
subject.87 In perhaps the most comprehensive study of this topic to date, Mark K Wells 
compared the management of emotional casualties by the British and American air 
forces. He discusses the work of ACDUs and was the first to examine the importance 
of NYDN centres.88 By considering Lawson’s figures and those from a Flying Personnel 
Research Committee report, he estimated that there were only around 200 LMF cases 
in Bomber Command each year.89 Wells uses many of the same sources as English, 
but written and published in 1995, neither were able to consider each other’s work. 
 
Later studies examined the use of psychiatry in the services. Sydney Brandon looked 
at recruitment, training and NYDNs. He concluded that the LMF procedure was 
neither necessary nor effective.90 Ben Shephard examined the concept of 
predisposition and the wartime understanding that neurosis only followed a traumatic 
event if the patient gained an advantage through it.91 He investigated the roles of the 
RAF’s consultant neurologists and psychiatrists and concluded that men were treated 
 
85Alan English, ‘A Predisposition to Cowardice? Aviation Psychology and the Genesis 
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harshly as a deterrent to preserve the fighting force.92 Edgar Jones attempted to ‘assess 
the impact of the procedure on morale and performance and answer why the 
deterrent of LMF was needed.’93 He placed it in the context of both shell shock and 
contemporary attitudes to combat and PTSD. He was the first to quote from a report 
by Squadron Leader Eric Jewesbury, the neurologist at RAF Hospital Rauceby, but 
there are contradictions in his work. Jones claimed that aircrew ranks and badges 
were lost at NYDN centres before they were posted to ACDUs, and he also 
mentioned that specialists saw aircrew as out-patients at NYDN centres. It was not 
within the remit of neuropsychiatric specialists to make an executive decision about 
an individual’s right to wear wings. Unless they were admitted for further tests and 
observation, aircrew who attended hospitals such as RAF Rauceby as outpatients 
return to their units; they also were not LMF. Like English, by discussing the treatment 
of patients with diagnosed medical conditions at NYDN centres, he conflates LMF 
with medical illnesses. He also fuelled the mythology around LMF by suggesting that 
Wing Commander Lawson’s papers were lost.94 In Bomber Boys, popular historian, 
Patrick Bishop used two anonymised cases of LMF as well as referencing previous 
studies and their primary sources. He concluded that ‘no one seemed to know what 
happened to LMF cases after they disappeared from sight.’95 However, by including an 
example of a crew who was court martialled, his later Air Force Blue, conflated LMF 
with the kind of outcome the procedure was intended to avoid.96 Richard Overy’s 
summary of LMF avoids these pitfalls. He describes it as ‘a stigma designed as an 
emasculating deterrent to any sign of weakness.’ He discusses predisposition and 
stress but makes the distinction between those with diagnosable ‘neurotic conditions’ 
and those who were ‘defined as fully fit but fearful.’ Highlighting that that only around 
a quarter of those referred to a neuropsychiatric specialist were passed to an 
executive board for a decision on LMF, he referenced Wells and quoted from 
Jewesbury’s report.97 This review of the literature highlights that the limited sources 
on and around the subject have been used and reused in order to calculate the 
numbers involved and to describe and explain the process. However, those who failed 
to make the distinction between LMF, medical cases and court martials have 
contributed to the mythology and notoriety of LMF.  
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Bloggers and public historians who have written specifically about LMF tend not to 
have engaged with new primary sources, rather they have relied on material published 
by those discussed above.98 These are important cultural sources as they influence 
both public understanding of the war and how veterans themselves may frame their 
experience in their testimonies. However, the nuances and distinctions between the 
executive and medical treatment of airmen are often lost in popular memory, and as 
Wells maintained, emotional responses plague discussions of the LMF disposal policy.99 
Repetitions of myths, inaccuracies, generalisations and unsubstantiated conclusions 
also riddle the history of LMF. After the publication of The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual 3 in 1980, PTSD ‘has mutated from a diagnostic category to a social trope.’100 
Retrospective diagnoses of PTSD are often inferred or applied to RAF aircrew and 
numerous other sources link LMF with PTSD.101 As Tracey Loughran, Edgar Jones, 
Simon Wessely, and others have argued however, shell shock, PTSD and LMF are not 
synonymous. There is an element of cultural construction to the manifestation of the 
symptoms of functional somatic syndromes and it is a mistake to diagnose PTSD 
retrospectively.102 The majority of the documents used by historians in previous 
examinations of LMF have been ‘top down’ sources written by medical professionals, 
senior officers and officials in the Air Ministry. Few describe the process from a first-
person perspective, and many veterans’ testimonies amplify the mythologies created 
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during and since the war. As with veteran memoirs published after the 1980s, when 
veterans discuss LMF in oral history interviews, their memories are sometimes 
coloured by their understanding of PTSD. 
 
Oral histories and victim narratives 
The history of Bomber Command is an example of difficult heritage, and frequently 
divides opinion.103 Strategic bombing has always been controversial and does not fit 
comfortably with the dominant cultural memories and an over simplified narrative of 
a ‘just war’. Bomber Command veterans have been labelled as heroes, as victims of 
poor leadership or as villains.104 As Frances Houghton has highlighted, many Bomber 
Command veterans are of the opinion that they were omitted from much of the 
formal post-war commemoration and ‘dominant national recollections’.105 In 2016, a 
veteran expressed his disappointment in the Bomber Command Clasp: ‘We’ve never 
got credit for what we did… we got a stupid little medal, it’s not a medal it’s a piece 
of tin’.106 Bomber Command only recently received official recognition with the 
memorial in London and the issue of the Bomber Command Clasp in 2012 and 2013. 
However, veterans continue to tell interviewers that despite their losses, a ‘proper’ 
campaign medal was not awarded, Churchill ignored them in his victory speech, and 
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Andrew Knapp, The horror and the glory: Bomber Command in British memories since 
1945. (2016) Mass Violence and Resistance, pp. 32-33. Available at: 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/68690/2/Civilians_AndrewKnapp_Draft3_CA%2526AK.p
df Accessed 17 February 2020. 
104For a discussion of the historiographical and cultural representations of Bomber 
Command see: Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A History of Bomber Command, 
(London: Tauris, 2014), pp. 137-157. 
105Frances Houghton, ‘The “missing chapter”: Bomber Command aircrew memoirs in 
the1990s and 2000s,’ in Noakes, L. and Pattinson, J. (eds), British Cultural Memory and 
the Second World War, (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 170. See also Lawrence and 
Ellin, ‘After Them, The Flood’, pp. 117-118;  
106International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive (IBCC) Julian Maslin, 
‘Interview with George Eric Cromarty,’ 
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/3387 Accessed 17 
February 2020. 
British Journal for Military History, Volume 6, Issue 3, November 2020 
 www.bjmh.org.uk  60 
Arthur Harris, their Commander, did not receive a peerage.107 Still shrouded in myth, 
LMF is a powerful and popular motif in these memories and is often used as an emotive 
example of injustice within their narratives. Believing they are still fighting for 
recognition, some veterans privilege anecdotes that reinforce a victim narrative. As 
well as LMF, they discuss the ‘chop rate’ (the number of air crew killed), being 
outgunned by night fighters, the danger from flak (anti-aircraft fire), and how the RAF 
lied to them about ‘scarecrow shells’ for example.108  
 
As part of the ‘memory boom’ identified by Erika Doss, as they reached their old age, 
many Second World War veterans felt the need to tell their stories and actively to 
transmit the past to future generations.109 At the time of writing, over 1,100 oral 
history interviews have been recorded for the IBCC Digital Archive. Almost half have 
searchable transcriptions; from these, 76 mention LMF.110 George Doble’s recollection 
of LMF conforms to the typical narrative of injustice 
 
I’ve known an instance of a guy who’d done thirty ops and he was told he’d got 
to do an extra five… and he said, “I’m not doing it.” He said, “I’ve had enough. 
I’ve done my bit and that’s it.” And that’s where this business of LMF comes in 
and they were sent to Eastchurch, where the LMF place was, and they were 
demoted, AC2s, and, I don’t know, just, used as spare parts I suppose.111  
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Many interviewees took the place of a previous crewmember, or had a crewmember 
replaced; Alexander Lamb’s navigator just ‘disappeared’ at a training unit.112 Other 
narratives of LMF include considerable amounts of flying stress. Percy Cannings told 
how the sole survivor of a mid-air collision was subjected to the LMF ritual in front of 
his peers.113 However, 13 interviewees are vague as to whether the reason airmen 
disappeared was due to illness or LMF. Alun Emlyn-Jones knew his pilot refused to fly 
because of pain following an injury, but was unaware how he was categorised.114 
Thomas Payne’s ‘frozen’ gunner ‘was taken away’ by ambulance never to be seen again, 
but Payne presumed ‘he was marked LMF’.115 Other interviewees saw LMF as a 
disciplinary process. Richard Franklin recalled that his flight engineer was ‘placed under 
arrest’ after he refused to fly.116 Seven interviewees describe the LMF ritual that 
occurred on other stations, but only three claim to have personally witnessed the 
humiliating stripping of rank and badges. Charles Green recalled a gunner who refused 
to fly after being ‘hose-piped’ by night fighters 
 
…this air gunner came in and he was ruddy crying. Absolutely crying. A bloke. 
You know. And he was trembling all over and he was saying, “never again. I’m 
not going never again. Never again.” … Everybody was talking about it… Then 
one day we were called out on parade… Everybody on the parade ground. 
Everybody. And they marched this lad out, air gunner, and stripped him of his, 
stripped him off of his, he’d been court martialled ‘cause he wouldn’t, wouldn’t 
fly again. And they stripped his tapes off and his brevet off and everything… they 
were that ruddy cruel but I know they marched him off and that was it.117 
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Interviewees had no way of knowing what happened to others, but their testimony 
often includes aspects of the accepted narrative of LMF that were outside their 
experience. Several spoke of airmen having ‘LMF’ rubber stamped in red on service 
documents and the shame of having this classification follow them into civilian life after 
the war.118 Only one source found for this study gives a first-person narrative of the 
LMF procedure. Flight Sergeant Roy Larkins was posted from Coastal Command to 
RAF Eastchurch in February 1945. Rather than being publicly humiliated, a ‘sympathetic 
officer’ told him to hand in his flying badge, stripes and crown. He was given a choice 
of outcome, and after a period of leave and some time at RAF Silloth as an orderly 
room runner, he was transferred to the mines. Larkins maintains that he was not LMF, 
but that he was victimised by his Commanding Officer.119 His testimony demonstrates 
that the LMF procedure was applied without recourse to the humiliating ritual 
stripping of badges. In 36 of the IBCC’s interviews men disappeared and were only 
presumed to be LMF. In the Imperial War Museum (IWM) sound archive 40 oral 
histories with veterans of Bomber Command have been tagged with ‘lack of moral 
fibre’ and are available online. All know the story, but none witnessed the humiliating 
parade. Most who remember someone on their squadron as potentially being LMF say 
they were quietly and quickly posted away.120 A squadron commander admitted he 
occasionally ‘had to send odd people off on LMF’; they saw the Medical Officer and 
were ‘quietly shipped out’.121 The evidence shows that it was more common for men 
to be discreetly removed from the station before any of the three categories in the 
waverer letter was applied to them. The ritual stripping of brevet and rank was not a 
common occurrence. The rumour of it was enough and many men posted away for 
medical or other reasons were thought to be LMF.  
 
Oral and written accounts created years after the events they describe must be used 
carefully. Veterans’ memories can be vague and although these oral histories possess 
the ‘powerful authority of survivor testimony’,122 they are hard to corroborate using 
other sources. Noble Frankland, Bomber Command veteran and historian, questioned 
eyewitnesses who asserted ‘I know, I was there’.123 Brian Harris had heard of LMF 
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during the war but admitted to learning about it in the books he had read after the 
war.124 The veterans interviewed for the IBCC Digital Archive suffer from the fallibility 
of memory, but their discussions of LMF are largely conjecture; LMF was something 
that happened to someone else. Veterans are also part of ‘mnemonic communities’.125 
They produced their testimony within the social, cultural and political context of the 
present, shaped by what they have seen, heard and read.126 Some embellish their 
narrative, tell the interviewer what they think they want to hear and project a 
favourable image of themselves. Originally influenced by wartime rumours, their 
understanding of LMF was reworked by their engagement with cultural sources, 
popular memory and histories since the war.127 Veterans joined associations and 
formed ‘fictive kinship’ groups and ‘families of remembrance’.128 They shared their 
stories amongst themselves at reunions and in association newsletters. During the 
war, the stigmatising LMF procedure and reassuring concept of ‘scarecrows’ both 
affected the morale of aircrew and helped them to continue flying operations. Since 
the war, these tropes have continued to resonate as part of the narrative veterans 
employ to gain recognition and to counter arguments that they were war criminals. 
The veteran interviews recorded for both the IWM and the IBCC appear to reinforce 
many of the myths about LMF. However, reading them across the grain, and in 
sufficient quantity, offers a new insight into LMF.     
 
Conclusion 
During the war, the different versions of the Air Ministry’s waverer letter were open 
to interpretation. Working together, the Commanding Officer and Medical Officer 
were entitled to categorise an airman as LMF, but most tried to avoid making such a 
decision. The waverer letter was amended throughout the war, and its interpretation 
varied from station to station depending on the senior officers’ beliefs and style of 
leadership. The LMF ritual was performed at some stations, but it was not part of 
official policy and far more men were passed to a NYDN centre or ACDU for 
assessment. Senior officers were keen to remove suspect aircrew from the station as 
quickly as possible to avoid any contagion. This also contributed to aircrew’s suspicion 
of the RAF’s psychiatrists and their mistaken understanding of the classification as a 
medical diagnosis; it fed the rumours of LMF. Once someone was removed from 
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operations however, a considerable effort was made to rule out a medical reason why 
they should not fly before their brevets were taken from them. 
 
The conditions at RAF Eastchurch and ACDUs were not as terrible as was rumoured; 
the established LMF procedure required decisions by Senior Officers, neuropsychiatric 
specialists, James Lawson, and a final board. It is important that all those discharged 
from flying duties, under both category one and two of the letter, lost their flying 
badges. This included men who were LMF and men who were medically downgraded; 
it is likely that anyone who saw the marks on their uniform where their wings and 
badges of rank once were assumed that they were LMF. Their sighting then became 
another anecdote reinforcing the myth. Due to the limited number of archival records, 
historians have explored medical sources, but this is not why LMF continues to be 
conflated with medical diagnoses. The RAF’s medical consultants argued that LMF was 
not a medical issue and attempted to change the procedure. At odds with the Air 
Ministry’s categories for disposal of airmen, Jewesbury and Stafford-Clark both 
described four categories according to predisposition and the amounts of stress 
experienced, but Stafford-Clark’s treatment of aircrew should be regarded as unusual. 
The history of Bomber Command is far more complex than the simple binary 
narratives of heroes or villains, victors or victims. Further mythologised and amplified 
after the war, LMF is part of the cultural memory constructed by veterans and their 
families as part of the victim narrative used to push for recognition for Bomber 
Command.  
 
From over 125,000 aircrew in Bomber Command, only a tiny percentage were 
removed from flying in any of the three categories. More aircrew were removed from 
flying duties during training – but stories about aircrew who were washed out during 
training are not as useful to either the wartime narrative of LMF or the post-war victim 
narrative of a draconian policy. It is a mistake to apply an anachronistic diagnosis 
retrospectively, but it has become common to consider LMF through the lens of 
trauma and to claim that those who were LMF were suffering from undiagnosed PTSD.  
 
Veterans reiterate the rumours they heard about LMF during the war and embellish 
their tales with information from popular history and cultural sources, but they have 
no idea what happened to their colleagues after they disappeared. Airmen 
‘disappeared’ from bomber stations for many reasons during the war. Men were sent 
on leave, they were attached or transferred to other squadrons, or posted away after 
completing their tour. Some were sent to NYDN centres for assessment, a few were 
LMF and of course, many failed to return from operations. LMF was never a medical 
condition, but as part of the rumours about it that served to keep aircrew flying, a 
number of those who departed from their squadron for medical or disciplinary 
reasons were regarded as LMF. RAF personnel confused LMF with both psychological 
casualties and court martial cases at the time, and they continue to be conflated by 
LACK OF MORAL FIBRE IN BOMBER COMMAND AND POPULAR CULTURE 
 
65 www.bjmh.org.uk 
veterans and historians today. The rumours of what happened to airmen after they 
disappeared were almost as effective as actually witnessing a ritual parade. These 
horror stories reinforced the procedure as a deterrent to prevent airmen from 
refusing to fly. They continue to be repeated by surviving veterans. Although it was an 
indeterminate category, LMF has solidified since the war to become an important part 
of the history of Bomber Command. 
 
 
